The article studies navigability of an autonomous agent in a maze where some rooms may be indistinguishable. In a previous work the authors have shown that the properties of navigability in such a setting depend on whether an agent has perfect recall. Navigability by strategies with perfect recall is a transitive relation and navigability by memoryless strategies is not. Independently, Li and Wang proposed a notion of navigability with intermediate constraints for linear navigation strategies. Linear strategies are different from both perfect recall and memoryless strategies.
Introduction
Autonomous agents such as self-navigating missiles, self-driving cars, and robotic vacuum cleaners are often facing the challenge of navigating under conditions of uncertainty about their exact location. A solution to such a problem can be formally described in terms of instructions that transition a system from one state to another, assuming that the agent cannot distinguish some of the states. We refer to such systems as epistemic transition systems. represent the indistinguishability relation. This relation forms four classes of indistinguishable states: rx 1 s " tx 1 , x 2 , x 3 u, ra 1 s " ta 1 , a 2 , a 3 u, ry 1 s " ty 1 , y 2 , y 3 u, and rb 1 s " tb 1 , b 2 , b 3 u. The directed arrows in the figure represent the possible transitions that the system can take. The label on an arrow specifies the instruction that should be invoked to accomplish this transition. For example, instruction 1 can be used to transition the system from state x 2 to state a 2 .
In this article we study navigability between classes of indistinguishable states. For instance, consider a navigation strategy s that invokes instruction 1 in classes rx 1 s and rb 1 s and instruction 0 in classes ra 1 s and ry 1 s. Note that if the system T 1 starts in any state of class rx 1 s, then this strategy will eventually bring the system to state y 3 of class ry 1 s. Similarly, if the system starts in any state of class ry 1 s, then the same instruction will eventually bring the system to state x 3 of class rx 1 s. Generally speaking, we say that a strategy can be used to navigate from class u to class v if from each state of class u the strategy will eventually transition the system to some (not necessarily always the same) state of class v.
Note that the same strategy s can also be used to navigate from each state of classes rx 1 s, ra 1 s, and ry 1 s to state b 3 of class rb 1 s. Generally speaking, we say that a strategy can be used to navigate from set of classes A to set of class B if from each state of each class in set A the strategy will eventually transition the system to some (not necessarily always the same) state of some (not necessarily always the same) class in set B.
The main focus of our work is on navigability between classes with intermediate constraints. If A, B, and C are three sets of indistinguishability classes of states in an epistemic transition system, then by A B C we denote the existence of a strategy to navigate from set A to set C under which the system is constrained to intermediate states in set B. For the sake of mathematical elegance that will become clear later, we include the initial but not the final state into the intermediate constraint. That is, the intermediate constraint lists all classes in which one would actually need to use the strategy to determine which instruction to invoke. For example, trx 1 s, ra 1 su trx1s,ra1su try 1 su, because the discussed earlier strategy s can be used to navigate from any state in classes rx 1 s and ra 1 s to state y 3 of class ry 1 s while being constrained to use only states in classes rx 1 s and ra 1 s as intermediate states.
The properties of navigability depend on the type of strategies we consider. In this article we will mention three such types: perfect recall strategies, memoryless strategies, and linear strategies. A perfect recall strategy can make a decision about the instruction to be invoked based on the complete history of all classes visited and the instructions used so far. As the name suggests, a memoryless strategy can only take into account the indistinguishability class the system is currently in. Finally, a linear strategy is a list of instructions that should be executed in the given order without taking into account the past and present indistinguishability classes.
The discussed earlier strategy s (that uses instruction 1 in classes rx 1 s and rb 1 s and instruction 0 in classes ra 1 s and ry 1 s) is memoryless because it chooses an instruction based only on the current class. As we have seen earlier, this strategy can be used to navigate from class rx 1 s to class ry 1 s while being constrained to classes rx 1 s and ra 1 s. Navigation from class ry 1 s to class rx 1 s while constrained to classes ry 1 s and ra 1 s is less trivial. It can be accomplished using a perfect recall strategy that uses instruction 1 each time in class ry 1 s and on the first and the third visit to a state in class ra 1 s and uses instruction 0 on the second visit to a state in class ra 1 s. However, a memoryless strategy to navigate from class ry 1 s to class rx 1 s while constrained to classes ry 1 s and ra 1 s does not exist. Indeed, any such strategy will have to transition the system from state y 3 to state a 3 . It also will have to use the same instruction on each visit to each state of class ra 1 s. If this instruction is 0, then the system will "bounce" back from state a 3 to state y 3 . If the instruction is 1, then the system will "loop" between states a 1 and a 3 . In either of these cases it will never reach a state in class rx 1 s. There is no single linear strategy to navigate from all states of class rx 1 s to a state in class ry 1 s of the epistemic transition system T 1 , even without intermediate constraints. However, there are separate such strategies for each state in class rx 1 s. For example, linear strategy 1100 navigates the system from state x 1 to state y 3 while constrained to classes rx 1 s and ra 1 s.
We gave a complete axiomatization of the properties of navigability without intermediate constraints for perfect recall and memoryless strategies in [11] . A similar result for linear strategies was given by Wang in [34] . The major property that distinguishes navigability by these three types of strategies is transitivity. While navigability by perfect recall and linear strategies is a transitive relation, navigability by memoryless strategies is not. Indeed, consider transition system T 2 depicted in Figure 2 . Note that the memoryless strategy that invokes instruction 0 in each state can be used to navigate from class rxs to class rys in this transition system. Similarly, the memoryless strategy that invokes instruction 1 in each state can be used to navigate from class rys to class rzs. However, there is no memoryless strategy to navigate from class rxs to class rzs because such a strategy would have to use the same instruction in states a 1 and a 2 . Complete axiomatization of navigability by linear strategies with intermediate constraints was given by Li and Wang [21] . In this article we propose such axiomatization for memoryless strategies. An important observation about the axiomatization that we propose is that it includes a restricted form of transitivity. Namely, it contains axiom A B C Ñ pC D E Ñ A BYD Eq, where classes B and D are disjoint. In other words, although a simple language of navigability without constraints does not allow to capture any meaningful form of transitivity for memoryless strategies, the more expressive language with intermediate constraints can do this.
Other Related Literature
Most of the existing literature on logical systems for reasoning about strategies is focused on modal logics for coalition strategies. Logics of coalition power were proposed by Marc Pauly [28, 29] , who also proved the completeness of the basic logic of coalition power. Pauly's approach has been widely studied in literature [14, 33, 9, 30, 3, 4, 7] . An alternative, binary-modality-based, logical system was proposed by More and Naumov [22] .
Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman introduced Alternating-Time Temporal Logic (ATL) that combines temporal and coalition modalities [5] . Completeness of ATL was shown by Goranko and Drimmelen [15] . Van der Hoek and Wooldridge proposed to combine ATL with epistemic modality to form Alternating-Time Temporal Epistemic Logic [32] . However, they did not prove the completeness theorem for the proposed logical system. A completeness theorem for a logical system that combines coalition power and epistemic modalities was proven byÅgotnes and Alechina [1] . An alternative approach to expressing the power to achieve a goal in a temporal setting is the STIT logic [8, 17, 18, 16, 27] .
[10] has shown that coalition logic can be embedded into a variation of STIT logic.
The notion of a strategy that we consider in this article is much more restrictive than the the notion of strategy in the works mentioned above. Namely, we assume that the strategy must be based only on the information available to the agent. This is captured in our setting by requiring the strategy to be the same in all indistinguishable states or all indistinguishable histories. This restriction on strategies has been studied before under different names. Jamroga andÅgotnes talk about "knowledge to identify and execute a strategy" [19] , Jamroga and van der Hoek discuss "difference between an agent knowing that he has a suitable strategy and knowing the strategy itself" [20] . Van Benthem calls such strategies "uniform" [31] . Naumov and Tao [23] used the term "executable strategy". Agotnes and Alechina gave a complete axiomatization of an interplay between single-agent knowledge and know-how modalities [2] . Naumov and Tao [23] axiomatized interplay between distributed knowledge modality and know-how coalition strategies for enforcing a condition indefinitely. A similar complete logical system in a single-agent setting for know-how strategies to achieve a goal in multiple steps rather than to maintain a goal is developed by Fervari, Herzig, Li, Wang [12] . Naumov and Tao proposed a complete trimodal logical system that describes an interplay between distributed knowledge, coalition power, and know-how coalition power modalities for goals achievable in one step [24] as well as a modal logic for second-order know-how [25] . All of the above works do not consider a perfect recall setting. Modal logic that combines distributed knowledge with coalition power in a perfect recall setting has been recently proposed by Naumov and Tao [26] . Unlike this article, they only consider goals achievable in one step.
Most of the mentioned above works deal with multiagent game-like settings where coalitions of players cooperate to achieve a certain goal. Although navigability explicitly assumes existence of only one agent, it can be thought of as a two-person game between the agent and the environment because of our assumption in this article that transitions in the system might be nondeterministic. Thus, the modal logic approach and the relational approach provide two different languages for describing the same phenomenon.
Article Outline
The rest of this article is structured as following. In Section 4 we introduce the syntax of our logical system. In Section 5 we define the formal semantics of this system. Section 6 lists the axioms of our system. In Section 7 we give several examples of formal derivations. These results will be used later in the proof of completeness. Section 8 and Section 9 prove the soundness and the completeness of our logical system respectively. Section 10 concludes.
Syntax
In the introduction we discussed the ternary relation A B C as a relation between three sets of indistinguishability classes of a given epistemic transition system. Note that A, B, and C here are not syntactical objects, but sets of states in a specific system. In the rest of this article we present a formal logical system capturing the universally true properties of this relation in an arbitrary epistemic transition system. Note that sets of classes A, B and C are specific to a particular epistemic transition system and thus can not be used to formally state properties common to all epistemic transition systems. In this article we overcome this issue by assuming that there is a fixed finite set V of views. A transition model specifies an observation function from states to views instead of specifying an indistinguishability relation between states. Informally, two states are indistinguishable if and only if the values of the observation function on these two states are equal. Using views instead of classes the language of our logical system can be defined independently from a particular epistemic transition system as follows. Definition 1. Let Φ be the minimal set of formulae such that
The above assumption that set of views V is finite is used later in the proof of completeness.
Semantics
In this section we define formal semantics of our logical system. Definition 2. Epistemic transition system is a tuple pS, o, I, tÑ i u iPI q, where 1. S is a set of states, 2. o : S Ñ V is an observation function, 3. I is a set of instructions, 4. Ñ i is a binary relation between states for each i P I.
For example, for the epistemic transition system T 2 depicted in Figure 2 , set S is tx, a 1 , y, a 2 , zu. Observation function o is such that opxq " v 1 , opa 1 q " opa 2 q " v 2 , opyq " v 3 , and opzq " v 4 , where v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , and v 4 are arbitrary distinctive elements of set V . Instruction set I is t0, 1u. Relation Ñ 0 is tpx, a 1 q, pa 1 , yq, py, a 1 q, pa 2 , yq, pz, a 2 qu and relation Ñ 1 is tpx, xq, pa 1 , xq, py, a 2 q, pa 2 , zq, pz, zqu.
Note that epistemic transition system T 2 is deterministic in the sense that there is a unique state v into which the system transitions from a given state w under a given instruction i. Definition 2 specifies a transition system in terms of a transitive relation Ñ i . We allow several states v such that w Ñ i v to model nondeterministic transitions. We allow the set of such states v to be empty to model terminating transitions. Informally, if in a state w an instruction i is invoked such that there is no v for which w Ñ i v, then the system terminates and no further instructions are executed.
In the introduction we made a distinction between memoryless and recall strategies. Since the rest of the article deals only with memoryless strategies, we refer to such strategies simply as strategies.
Definition 3.
A strategy is an arbitrary function from V to I.
A side effect of our choice to use views instead of equivalence classes is that there might be one or more views that are not values of the observation function on any state in the epistemic transition system. Such views define what we call "empty equivalence classes" in the introduction. Per Definition 3, a strategy must still be defined on such views.
The next definition specifies the paths in an epistemic transition system that start in a given set of views and are compatible with a given strategy.
Definition 4.
For any set A Ď V and any strategy s, let P ath s pAq be the set of all (finite or infinite) sequences w 0 , w 1 , w 2 ,¨¨¨P S such that 1. opw 0 q P A, and 2. w k Ñ spopw kw k`1 for each k ě 0 for which w k`1 exists.
For epistemic transition system T 2 , sequence x, a 1 , y belongs to set P ath s ptopxquq, where opxq is the view assigned in system in T 2 to state x and s is a strategy such that spvq " 0 for each v P V .
A path π 1 is an extension of a path π if π is a prefix of π 1 or π 1 " π.
Definition 5. M axP ath s pAq is the set of all sequences in P ath s pAq that are either infinite or cannot be extended to a longer sequence in P ath s pAq.
Note that we do not require paths to be simple. For epistemic transition system T 2 , the infinite sequence y, a 2 , z, z, . . . belongs to the set M axP ath s ptopyquq, where opyq is the view assigned in that epistemic transition system to state y and s is a strategy such that spvq " 1 for each v P V . Lemma 1. Any sequence in P ath s pAq can be extended to a sequence in M axP ath s pAq.
Proof. Any sequence in P ath s pAq which is not in M axP ath s pAq can be extended to a longer sequence in P ath s pAq. Repeating this step multiple times one can get a finite or an infinite sequence in M axP ath s pAq.
The next definition introduces a technical notation that we use to define the semantics of the restricted navigability relation A B C. Definition 6. Let U ntilpA, Bq be the set of all such sequences w 0 , w 1 , w 2 , . . . that there is k 0 ě 0 where 1. opw k q P A for each k ă k 0 and 2. opw k0 q P B.
Definition 7. For any epistemic transition system T and any formula ϕ, satisfiability relation T ( ϕ is defined as follows:
Note that although we allow non-deterministic transitions, item 1 in the above definition requires all paths from set M axP ath s pAq to belong to set U ntilpB, Cq. This is different from how non-deterministic computation is treated in the automata theory.
Axioms
In addition to the propositional tautologies in language Φ, our logical system contains the following axioms: If the subscript is omitted from the first three axioms, then the resulting properties are known in the database literature as Armstrong axioms [13, p. 81] . They give a sound and complete axiomatization of the functional dependency relation in database theory [6] .
The fourth axiom says that if there is a strategy to navigate from set A to set C passing only through set B, then there is a strategy to navigate from set A to set C passing only through set BzC. Indeed, once a state of a class of the set C is reached for the first time, there is no need to continue the execution of the strategy. Thus, the navigation path will never have to pass through set B X C. In essence, the axiom states that the execution of any strategy can be terminated once the desired goal is reached for the first time. For this reason we call this axiom the Early Bird axiom.
The Trivial Path axiom states that if there is a strategy to navigate from set A to set B through an empty set of states, then set AzB must be empty.
Finally, the Path to Nowhere axiom states that if there is a strategy to navigate from set A to a state in an empty set, then set A must be empty.
We write $ ϕ if formula ϕ is provable in our logical system using the Modus Ponens inference rule. We write X $ ϕ if formula ϕ is provable from the axioms of our system and the set of additional axioms X.
Examples of Derivations
The soundness and the completeness of our logical system is proven in Section 8 and Section 9. In this section we give several examples of formal derivations in this system. The results obtained here are used in the proof of the completeness.
Proof. By the Reflexivity axiom, $ A B 1 zB A. Hence, by the Transitivity
Proof. By the Transitivity axiom,
Hence, by the laws of logical reasoning,
At the same time, the assumption C Ď C 1 implies $ C ∅ C 1 by the Reflexivity axiom. Hence, A B C Ñ A B C 1 due to statement (1).
The three statements above by the laws of propositional reasoning imply that
At the same time,
is an instance of the Augmentation axiom. Finally, the formula
is an instance of the Transitivity axiom. Taken together, statement (2), statement (3), and statement (4) imply by the laws of propositional reasoning that
Proof. Assumption B X D Ď C implies that BzC Ď BzD. Thus, by Lemma 3, $ A BzC C Ñ A BzD C. At the same time $ A B C Ñ A BzC C by the Early Bird axiom. Hence, by the laws of propositional reasoning,
Note that A BzD C Ñ pC D E Ñ A BYD Eq is an instance of the Transitivity axiom. Therefore, $ A B C Ñ pC D E Ñ A BYD Eq by the laws of propositional reasoning.
Soundness
In this section we prove the soundness of our logical system. The soundness of each of the axioms is stated as a separate lemma. The soundness theorem for the logical system is given in the end of the section. We start with a technical lemma that lists properties of sets U ntil and M axP ath. These properties are used in the proofs of the soundness of the axioms.
Lemma 7.
For any set A, B, C Ď V and any strategy s: 
Proof. Statements 1 through 8 follow from Definition 5 and Definition 6.
Next, we show the soundness of the Reflexivity axiom and the Augmentation axiom.
Proof. By Lemma 7 and the assumption A Ď C, M axP ath s pAq Ď U ntilp∅, Aq Ď U ntilp∅, Cq Ď U ntilpB, Cq.
Therefore, T ( A B
The proof of the soundness of the Transitivity axiom is based on the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 10. If M axP ath s1 pAq Ď U ntilpB, Cq and s 1 pvq " s 2 pvq for each v P B, then M axP ath s2 pAq Ď U ntilpB, Cq.
Proof. Consider any sequence π " w 0 , w 1 ,¨¨¨P M axP ath s2 pAq. We prove that π P U ntilpB, Cq by separating the following two cases: Case I: opw k q P BzC for each k ě 0. Thus, s 1 popw k" s 2 popw kdue to the assumption of the lemma that s 1 pvq " s 2 pvq for each view v P B. Hence, the assumption π P M axP ath s2 pAq implies that π P M axP ath s1 pAq by Definition 4. Therefore, π P U ntilpB, Cq due to the assumption M axP ath s1 pAq Ď U ntilpB, Cq of the lemma. Case II: opw k q R BzC for some k ě 0. Let m ě 0 be the smallest such k that opw k q R BzC. Thus, 1. opw k q P pBzCq for each k ă m and 2. opw m q R pBzCq.
Hence, opw k q P B for each k ă m. We now further split Case II into two different parts: Part A: opw m q P C. Therefore, π P U ntilpB, Cq by Definition 6. Part B: opw m q R C. Note that condition opw k q P B for each k ă m implies that s 1 popw k" s 2 popw kfor each k ă m due to the assumption of the lemma that s 1 pvq " s 2 pvq for each v P B. Thus, w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w m P P ath s1 pAq. By Lemma 1, this sequence can be extended to a sequence π 1 " w 0 , w 1 , . . . , w m ,¨¨¨P M axP ath s1 pAq.
At the same time opw k q P B for each k ď m by the choice of k and opw m q R C by the assumption of the case. Thus, π 1 R U ntilpB, Cq. Therefore, π 1 P M axP ath s1 pAq but π 1 R U ntilpB, Cq, which contradicts the assumption M axP ath s1 pAq Ď U ntilpB, Cq of the lemma.
We are now ready to finish the proof of the soundness of the remaining axioms of our logical system.
Proof. By Definition 7, the assumption T ( A B
Define strategy s as follows
By Definition 7, it suffices to show that M axP ath s pAq Ď U ntilpB Y D, Eq. Indeed, consider any sequence π " w 0 , w 1 , w 2 ,¨¨¨P M axP ath s pAq. We will show that π P U ntilpB Y D, Eq. Note that s 1 pvq " spvq for each v P B by equation (5) . Note also that M axP ath s1 pAq Ď U ntilpB, Cq by the choice of strategy s 1 . Thus, M axP ath s pAq Ď U ntilpB, Cq By Lemma 10. Hence, π P U ntilpB, Cq because π P M axP ath s pAq. Thus, by Definition 6, there is an integer k 0 ě 0 such that 1. opw k q P B for each integer k such that k ă k 0 , 2. opw k0 q P C.
Note that s 2 pvq " spvq for each view v P D by equation (5) and the assumption B X D " ∅. Also, M axP ath s2 pCq Ď U ntilpD, Eq by the choice of strategy s 2 . Thus, M axP ath s pCq Ď U ntilpD, Eq by Lemma 10. Consider now the sequence π 1 " w k0 , w k0`1 , w k0`2 ,¨¨¨P M axP ath s pCq. Then, π 1 P U ntilpD, Eq. Hence, by Definition 6, there is an integer k
Therefore, π P U ntilpB Y D, Eq by Definition 6.
Proof. Let T ( A B C. Thus, M axP ath s pAq Ď U ntilpB, Cq by Definition 7. Hence, M axP ath s pAq Ď U ntilpB, Cq Ď U ntilpBzC, Cq, by Lemma 7. Therefore, T ( A BzC C by Definition 7.
Proof. By Definition 7, the assumption T ( A ∅ B implies that there is a strategy s such that M axP ath s pAq Ď U ntilp∅, Bq. Thus, by Lemma 7, M axP ath s pAzBq Ď M axP ath s pAq Ď U ntilp∅, Bq. Therefore, T ( pAzBq ∅ ∅ by Definition 7.
Proof. By Definition 7, the assumption T ( A B ∅ implies that there is a strategy s such that M axP ath s pAq Ď U ntilpB, ∅q. Thus, by Lemma 7, M axP ath s pAq Ď U ntilpB, ∅q " ∅ Ď U ntilp∅, ∅q.
Therefore, T ( A ∅ ∅ by Definition 7.
We end the section by stating the soundness theorem for our logical system. The theorem follows from the soundness of the individual axioms shown in the lemmas above. Theorem 1. If $ ϕ, then T ( ϕ for each epistemic transition system T .
Completeness
Suppose that set X is a fixed maximal consistent set of formulae in the language Φ. In this section we define a canonical epistemic transition system T pXq " pS, o, I, tÑ i u iPI q based on set X. Sets S and I of this system will be specified in terms of "valid" views.
Valid Views
Note that statement v ∅ ∅ means that there is a path from each state with view v to an empty set. Since no such path exists, statement v ∅ ∅ could be interpreted as saying that there are no states with view v. Informally, we think about such views as "invalid" views. All views which are not invalid are referred to as "valid" views. The canonical epistemic system will have at least one state for each valid view.
Below we prove several properties of valid views that are used later in the proof of the completeness.
Lemma 15. X $ tb 1 , . . . , b n u ∅ ∅, for each integer n ě 0 and all views b 1 , . . . , b n P V zV alid.
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on n. In the case n " 0, we need to show that X $ ∅ ∅ ∅, which is true by the Reflexivity axiom.
Suppose that X $ tb 1 , . . . , b n´1 u ∅ ∅. Thus, by the Augmentation axiom, X $ tb 1 , . . . , b n´1 , b n u ∅ b n . On the other hand, the assumption b n P V zV alid by Definition 8 implies X $ b n ∅ ∅. Therefore, by the Transitivity axiom,
Proof. Lemma 15 implies that X $ pBzV alidq ∅ ∅. Hence, by Lemma 5,
In other words, X $ A B C Ñ A BXV alid C.
Proof. Lemma 15 implies that X $ pCzV alidq ∅ ∅. Thus, by the Augmentation axiom, X $ C ∅ pC X V alidq. At the same time,
is an instance of the Transitivity axiom. Therefore, by the laws of propositional reasoning, X $ A B C Ñ A B pC X V alidq.
Proof. Suppose that there is v P pAzCq X V alid such that v R B. Thus, v P A, v R C, v P V oid, and v R B.
Recall that X $ A B C by the assumption of the lemma. It follows that X $ v B C by Lemma 2 and due to v P A. 
Instructions
For each formula A B C P X our canonical epistemic transition system T pXq will have a strategy to navigate from set A to set C through set B. Generally speaking, this strategy will use a dedicated instruction associated with formula A B C. Formally, the set of all instructions of transition system T pXq is defined as a set of triples pA, B, Cq satisfying the three properties listed below: Note that technically instruction pA, B, Cq is associated not with formula A B C, but rather with formula A AYB C. This is done in order to be able to assume that sets A, B, and C are pairwise disjoint. The next lemma is a general property of sets, which is used later.
We stated earlier that for each A B C P X there is a dedicated instruction used by the strategy that navigates from set A to set C through set B. In some situations this dedicated instruction could be pA, B, Cq. However in most cases we would need to slightly modify tuple pA, B, Cq into tuple pA 1 , B 1 , C 1 q in order for it to satisfy the three conditions from Definition 9. The next lemma specifies pA 1 , B 1 , C 1 q in terms of pA, B, Cq and proves that pA 1 , B 1 , C 1 q is an instruction.
1 " pBzpA Y Cqq X V alid, and C 1 " C X V alid.
Proof. By Definition 9, it suffices to show that sets A 1 , B 1 , and C 1 are pairwise disjoint and that X $ A 1 A 1 YB 1 C
1 . First, we show that these sets are pairwise disjoint:
" rAzCs X rC X V alids Ď rAzCs X C " ∅,
Next, we show that X $ A Informally, the next lemma states that if there is an instruction to navigate from a set A to an empty set, then set A must be empty.
Lemma 21. For any pA, B, Cq P I if C " ∅, then A " ∅.
Proof. The assumption pA, B, Cq P I implies that X $ A AYB C, by Definition 9. Thus, X $ A AYB ∅ due to the assumption C " ∅. Hence, X $ A ∅ ∅ by the Path to Nowhere axiom. Suppose that there is a view a P A. Hence, X $ a ∅ ∅ by Lemma 2. Thus, a R V alid by Definition 8. At the same time, A Ď V alid by Definition 9. Hence, a R A, which is a contradiction with the choice of view a.
States and Observation Function
There are two types of states in the canonical epistemic transition system T pXq. The first type of states comes from our intention for each v P V alid to have at least one state w such that opwq " v. Thus, we consider each v P V alid to be a state of the first type and define the observation function on the states of the first type as opvq " v.
In addition to the states of the first type, the canonical epistemic transition system also has states of the second type. Informally, these are intermediate states representing the result of a partial execution of an instruction. If an instruction i might transition the system from a state w of the first type to a state v of the first type, then the same instruction also might transition the system into a partial completion state pu, iq of the second type. If the same instruction i is invoked in state pu, iq, then the system will finish the transition into state v. If an instruction j ‰ i is invoked in state pu, iq, then the system abandons the partially completed instruction i and goes into a state prescribed by instruction j. The next two definitions formally capture this intuition. Symbol \ represents disjoint union.
Definition 10. S " V alid \ pV alidˆIq.
Lemma 22. opwq P V alid for each w P S.
Proof. The statement of the lemma follows from Definition 10 and Definition 11.
Transitions
Recall that the set of states of a canonical transition model is equal to the disjoint union V alid \ pV alidˆIq. We refer to a state as having type one if it belongs to set V oid and type two if it belongs to set V alidˆI. 1. a "full" transition from any state w such that opwq P A to any state u P C of the first type, 2. a "partial" transition from any state w such that opwq P A and state w is not a partial completion for transition pA, B, Cq, to a state pv, pA, B, Cqq of the second type such that v P A Y B, 3. a "partial" transition from any state w such that opwq P A Y B and state w is a partial completion for transition pA, B, Cq, to any state u P C.
The next definition captures the above informal description.
Definition 12.
If i " pA, B, Cq P I, then
This concludes the definition of the canonical epistemic transition system T pXq " pS, o, I, tÑ i u iPI q. The next two lemmas prove basic properties of the transition relation Ñ i . These properties are used later in the proof of the completeness.
Lemma 23. For any strategy s, any set E Ď V alid, any sequence π P M axP ath s pEq, and any element w of π, if spopwqq " pA, B, Cq and opwq P A, then w cannot be the last element of sequence π.
Proof. By Definition 11, the assumption opwq P A implies that w P A \ pAˆIq. By Lemma 21, the same assumption opwq P A implies that there is a view c P C. Thus, w Ñ pA,B,Cq c by Definition 12. Hence, w Ñ spopwqq c due to the assumption spopwqq " pA, B, Cq. Therefore, element w cannot be the last element of sequence π by Definition 5.
Lemma 24. For any strategy s, any set E Ď V alid, any sequence π P M axP ath s pEq, and any two consecutive elements w and w 1 of π such that
the sequence π contains an element w 2 immediately after the element w 1 such that opw 2 q P C.
Proof. By Definition 11, assumption w P A \ pAˆIq implies that opwq P A. Hence, by Lemma 21, set C contains at least one element c. Note that w 1 Ñ pA,B,Cq c by Definition 12 due to the assumption w 1 P pAYBqˆtpA, B, Cqu of the lemma. Thus, by Definition 5, element w 1 is not the last element of sequence π.
Let w 2 be the element of sequence π that immediately follows element w 1 . Hence, w 1 Ñ spopw 1w 2 . Thus, w 1 Ñ pA,B,Cq w 2 by the assumption spopw 1" pA, B, Cq of the lemma. Then, w 2 P C by Definition 12 and due to the assumption w 1 P pA Y BqˆtpA, B, Cqu of the lemma. Therefore, opw 2 q P C by Definition 11.
Provability Implies Satisfiability for Atomic Formulae
In this section we show if an atomic proposition is provable from set X, then it is satisfied in the canonical epistemic transition system. The converse of this statement is shown later in Lemma 34.
Proof. Let i 0 " pA 1 , B 1 , C 1 q, where A 1 " pAzCq X V alid, B 1 " pBzpA Y Cqq X V alid, and C 1 " C X V alid. Thus, i 0 P I by Lemma 20. Define strategy s to be a constant function such that spvq " i 0 for each view v P V . By Definition 7, it suffices to show that M axP ath s pAq Ď U ntilpB, Cq.
Consider any path π " w 0 ,¨¨¨P M axP ath s pAq. By Definition 4, opw 0 q P A. Note that if opw 0 q P C, then π P U ntilpB, Cq by Definition 6. In the rest of the proof, we assume that opw 0 q R C. Thus, opw 0 q P pAzCq X V alid by Lemma 22. Hence, opw 0 q P A 1 by the choice of set A 1 . Then, by Lemma 23, sequence π must contain at least one more element w 1 after element w 0 . Then, w 0 Ñ spopw0qq w 1 by Definition 4. Hence, w 0 Ñ i0 w 1 by the choice of strategy s. Then, w 0 Ñ pA 1 ,B 1 ,C 1 q w 1 by the choice of instruction i 0 . By Definition 12, statement w 0 Ñ pA 1 ,B 1 ,C 1 q w 1 implies that one of the following three cases takes place: Case I: w 0 P A 1 \ pA 1ˆI q and w 1 P C 1 . Thus, opw 0 q P A 1 and opw 1 q P C 1 by Definition 11. Hence, opw 0 q P pAzCq X V alid and opw 1 q P C X V alid due to the choice of sets A 1 and C 1 . Thus, opw 0 q P B by Lemma 18 and also opw 1 q P C. Therefore, π P U ntilpB, Cq by Definition 6. Case II:
Izti 0 uqq and Izti 0 uqq,
Thus, by Lemma 24, sequence π must contain an element w 2 immediately after the element w 1 such that opw 2 q P C 1 . Hence opw 2 q P C by the choice of set C 1 . Thus, we have opw 0 q, opw 1 q P B and opw 2 q P C. Therefore, π P U ntilpB, Cq by Definition 6. Case III: w 0 P pA 1 Y B 1 qˆti 0 u and w 1 P C 1 . Thus, opw 0 q P A 1 Y B 1 and opw 1 q P C 1 by Definition 11. Hence, opw 0 q P pppAzCq X V alidqq Y B 1 and opw 1 q P C by choice of sets A 1 and C 1 . Thus, opw 0 q P B Y B 1 by Lemma 18 and also opw 1 q P C. Hence, opw 0 q P B by the choice of set B
1 . Therefore, π P U ntilpB, Cq by Definition 6.
Satisfiability Implies Provability for Atomic Formulae
The goal of this section is to show the converse of Lemma 25. This result is stated later in the section as Lemma 34. To prove the result, due to Definition 7, it suffices to show that X & E F G implies that M axP ath s pEq Ę U ntilpF, Gq for each strategy s. In other words, we need to show that for any strategy s there is a path π P M axP ath s pEq that either never comes to G or leaves F before coming to G. To construct this path, we first define G˚as a set of all starting states from which paths under strategy s unavoidably lead to set G never leaving set F . According to Definition 14, set G˚is a union of an infinite chain of sets G " G 0 Ď G 1 Ď G 2 . . . . Sets tG i u iě0 are defined recursively below. The same definition also specifies the auxiliary families of sets tH i u iě0 , tA i u iě1 , tB i u iě1 , tC i u iě1 , tAì u iě1 , and tBì u iě1 that will be used to state and prove various properties of family tG i u iě0 .
Definition 13. For any sets F, G Ď V and any strategy s, let 1. G 0 " G and H 0 " ∅, 2. choose any instruction pA n , B n , C n q P I such that
and define (i) Aǹ " ta P A n | spaq " pA n , B n , C n qu,
3. if no instruction pA n , B n , C n q P I satisfying condition 2a,2b,2c,2d, and 2e exists, then stop.
Next we state and prove properties of the families of the sets specified in Definition 13.
Proof. By item (2b) of Definition 13, there must exist a view a 0 P ta P A n | spaq " pA n , B n , C n qu such that a 0 R G n´1 . Thus, a 0 P Aǹ zG n´1 by item (2i) of Definition 13.
Suppose that A n " A m . Hence, Aǹ " Am by item (2i) of Definition 13. Notice also that G n´1 Ě G m by item (2iii) of Definition 13 and the assumption n ą m. Then, a 0 P Aǹ zG n´1 " AmzG n´1 Ď AmzG m . Hence, Am Ę G m , which contradicts item (2iii) of Definition 13.
Lemma 27. Sets Aǹ and H n´1 are disjoint.
Proof. Suppose that there is a view v such that v P Aǹ and v P H n´1 . Hence, by items (1) and (2iv) of Definition 13, there must exist m ă n such that v P Bm. Thus, spvq " pA n , B n , C n q and spvq " pA m , B m , C m q by items (2i) and (2ii) of Definition 13, which contradicts Lemma 26.
Lemma 28. Sets Bǹ and H n´1 are disjoint.
Proof. Suppose that there is a view v such that v P Bǹ and v P H n´1 . Hence, by items (1) and (2iv) of Definition 13, there must exist m ă n such that v P Bm. Thus, spvq " pA n , B n , C n q and spvq " pA m , B m , C m q by item (2ii) of Definition 13, which contradicts Lemma 26.
Lemma 29. pAǹ Y Bǹ q X pG n´1 Y H n´1 q Ď G n´1 , for each n ě 1.
By Lemma 27 and Lemma 28,
Proof. Note that C n Ď G n´1 by item (2e) of Definition 13. Thus, $ C n ∅ G n´1 by the Reflexivity axiom. Also, X $ A n AnYBn C n by Definition 9. Thus, X $ A n AnYBn G n´1 by the Transitivity axiom. Hence,
because Aǹ Ď A n and Bǹ Ď B n by item (2i) and item (2ii) of Definition 13. Note that A n zAǹ Ď G n´1 and B n zBǹ Ď G n´1 by items (2c), (2d), (2i) and (2ii) of Definition 13. Thus, by Lemma 3,
Hence, by Lemma 2 and due to item (2i) of Definition 13,
Thus, X $ Aǹ Y G n´1 Aǹ YGn´1YBǹ G n´1 by the Augmentation axiom. Then, X $ G n GnYBǹ G n´1 by by item (2iii) of Definition 13.
Lemma 31. X $ G n GnYHn G Proof. We prove this statement by induction on n. If n " 0, then G n " G by item (1) of Definition 13. Therefore, $ G n GnYHn G by the Reflexivity axiom.
Suppose that n ą 0. Thus, X $ G n GnYBǹ G n´1 by Lemma 30. Thus, X $ G n pGnzGn´1qYpBǹ zGn´1q G n´1 by the Early Bird axiom. Thus, X $ G n Aǹ YpBǹ zGn´1q G n´1 , by by item (2iii) of Definition 13. Hence, X $ G n Aǹ YBǹ G n´1 by Lemma 3. At the same time, X $ G n´1 Gn´1YHn´1 G by the induction hypothesis. Thus, X $ G n Aǹ YBǹ YGn´1YHn´1 G by Lemma 6 taking into account Lemma 29. Therefore, X $ G n GnYHn G by items (2iii) and (2iv) of Definition 13.
There is n ě 0 such that G˚" G n .
Proof. By Definition 13 and Definition 14, we have G 0 Ď G 1 Ď G 2¨¨¨Ď G˚Ď V . Thus, the statement of the lemma follows from the assumption in Section 4 that set V is finite.
Proof of Claim. Suppose that pr 2 pwq " pA, B, Cq. Then, by the choice of instruction pA, B, Cq, we have pr 2 pw k q " spopw k qq. Thus, w k R W by the choice of set W , which is a contradiction with the choice of sequence π.
Claim 3. opw k q P A.
Proof of Claim. Suppose opw k q R A. First we show π P M axP ath s pEq. Assume π R M axP ath s pEq. Thus, by Definition 5 and because opw 0 q P E, there must exist state w k`1 P S such that w k Ñ spopw kw k`1 . Hence, w k Ñ pA,B,Cq w k`1 by the choice of the instruction pA, B, Cq. Thus, by Definition 12, the assumption opw k q R A implies that w k P pA Y BqˆtpA, B, Cqu, which is a contradiction with Claim 2. Therefore, π P M axP ath s pEq.
Recall that M axP ath s pEq Ď U ntilpF, Gq by the choice of strategy s. Hence, π P U ntilpF, Gq. Thus, by Definition 6, there is m ě 0 such that opw m q P G. Hence, opw m q P G 0 by Definition 13. Thus, opw m q P G˚by Definition 14. Therefore, w m R W by the choice of W and Definition 11, which is a contradiction with the choice of sequence π.
Proof of Claim. Suppose that there is c P C such that c R G˚. Note that opw k q P A by Claim 3. Thus, w k Ñ pA,B,Cq c by Definition 12 and the assumption c P C. At the same time, the assumption c R G˚implies c P V zG˚. Which implies that c P W by the choice of set W . Hence, sequence π can be extended by at least one more element, namely by state c, which is a contradiction with the choice of sequence π.
Proof of Claim. Suppose that there is x P pA Y BqzpF Y Gq. Recall that opw k q P A. Thus, w k P A \ pAˆpIztpA, B, Cquqq by Definition 11 and Claim 2. Thus, w k Ñ pA,B,Cq px, pA, B, Cqq by Definition 12 and because x P A Y B. Let π 1 " π, px, pA, B, Cqq. In other words, π 1 is the extension of sequence π by an additional element px, pA, B, Cqq. Note that π 1 P P ath s pEq by the choice of sequence π and because w k Ñ pA,B,Cq px, pA, B, Cqq. By Lemma 1, sequence π 1 can be extended to a sequence π 2 P M axP ath s pEq. Thus, π 2 P U ntilpF, Gq by the choice of strategy s.
At the same time, w 1 , . . . , w k P W by the choice of sequence π. Thus, we have opw 1 q, . . . , opw k q R G˚by the choice of set W . Then, by Definition 14, opw 1 q, . . . , opw k q R G 0 . Hence, opw 1 q, . . . , opw k q R G by Definition 13.
Recall that x P pA Y BqzpF Y Gq. Thus, opx, pA, B, Cqq R F Y G. Then, opw 1 q, . . . , opw k q, opx, pA, B, Cqq R G and opx, pA, B, Cqq R F . Therefore, π 2 R U ntilpF, Gq by Definition 6, which is a contradiction with the above observation π 2 P U ntilpF, Gq.
Claim 6. tx P A Y B | spxq ‰ pA, B, Cqu Ď G˚.
Proof of Claim. Suppose that there is x P A Y B such that spxq ‰ pA, B, Cq and x R G˚. Recall that opw k q P A. Thus, w k P A \ pAˆpIztpA, B, Cquqq by Definition 11 and Claim 2. Thus, w k Ñ pA,B,Cq px, pA, B, Cqq by Definition 12 and because x P A Y B.
At the same time, opx, pA, B, Cqq " x R G˚by Definition 11 and the assumption x R G˚. Hence, px, pA, B, Cqq P W by the choice of W and the assumption spxq ‰ pA, B, Cq.
Therefore, sequence π can be extended by at least one more element, namely by state px, pA, B, Cqq, which is a contradiction with the choice of sequence π.
We are now ready to finish the proof of the lemma. Note that set G n zG n´1 is not empty for each n ě 0 by item (2b) of Definition 13. Thus, the recursive construction of chain G 0 Ď G 1 Ď G 2 . . . , as given in Definition 13, must terminate due to set V being finite. Suppose that the last element of the chain G 0 Ď G 1 Ď G 2 . . . is set G k´1 . To come to a contradiction, it suffices to show that at least one more set can be added to the chain G 0 Ď G 1 Ď G 2 . . . by choosing instruction pA n , B n , C n q to be pA, B, Cq. To prove the latter, we need to show that instruction pA, B, Cq satisfies conditions (2a) through (2e) of Definition 13. Indeed, condition (2a) is satisfied by Claim 5. Condition (2b) is satisfied because spopw kP A by Claim 3 and opw k q R G k´1 " G˚because w k P W by Claim 2. Conditions (2c) and (2d) are satisfied by Claim 6. Finally, condition (2e) is satisfied by Claim 4. This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Completeness: The Final Steps
In this section we use Lemma 25 and Lemma 34 to finish the proof of the completeness theorem. The completeness theorem itself is stated below as Theorem 2.
Lemma 35. T pXq ( ϕ if and only if ϕ P X.
Proof. Induction on the structural complexity of formula ϕ. In the base case the statement of the lemma follows from Lemma 25 and Lemma 34. The induction step follows from the maximality and the consistency of set X in the standard way.
Theorem 2. If T ( ϕ for every epistemic transition system T , then $ ϕ.
Proof. Suppose & ϕ. Let X be a maximal consistent set containing formula ϕ. Thus, T pXq ( ϕ by Lemma 35. Therefore, T pXq * ϕ.
Conclusion
In our previous work [11] , we have shown that navigability by perfect recall strategies is transitive and navigability by memoryless strategies is not. In this article we observe that the situation is different if one considers a more general notion of navigability with intermediate constraints. Namely, in this new setting certain form of transitivity holds even for memoryless strategies. The main technical contribution of the article is a sound and complete axiomatization of all properties of navigability by memoryless strategies with intermediate constraints.
In this article and in [11] , we compare the properties of the navigability by perfect recall and memoryless strategies. An interesting possible direction for future work could be to consider navigability by agents with restricted memory. Such as, for example, navigability by finite state machines of a given size.
